On December 9, 2011, Complainant filed an appeal concerning her equal employment opportunity (EEO) complaint alleging employment discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. For the following reasons, the Commission finds that the Complainant’s complaint of discrimination based on gender identity, change of sex, and/or transgender status is cognizable under Title VII and remands the complaint to the Agency for further processing.

BACKGROUND¹
Complainant, a transgender woman, was a police detective in Phoenix, Arizona. In December 2010 she decided to relocate to San Francisco for family reasons. According to her formal complaint, Complainant was still known as a male at that time, having not yet made the transition to being a female.

Complainant’s supervisor in Phoenix told her that the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (Agency) had a position open at its Walnut Creek crime laboratory for which the Complainant was qualified. Complainant is trained and certified as a National Integrated Ballistic Information Network (NIBIN) operator and a BrassTrax ballistics investigator.

Complainant discussed the position with the Director of the Walnut Creek lab by telephone, in either December 2010 or January 2011, while still presenting as a man. According to Complainant, the telephone conversation covered her experience, credentials, salary and

¹ The facts in this section are taken from the EEO Counselor’s Report and the formal complaint of discrimination. Because this decision addresses a jurisdictional issue, we offer no position on the facts themselves and thus no position on whether unlawful discrimination occurred in this case.
benefits. Complainant further asserts that, following the conversation, the Director told her she would be able to have the position assuming no problems arose during her background check. The Director also told her that the position would be filled as a civilian contractor through an outside company.

Complainant states that she talked again with the Director in January 2011 and asked that he check on the status of the position. According to Complainant in her formal complaint, the Director did so and reasserted that the job was hers pending completion of the background check. Complainant asserts, as evidence of her impending hire, that Aspen of DC ("Aspen"), the contractor responsible for filling the position, contacted her to begin the necessary paperwork and that an investigator from the Agency was assigned to do her background check.²

On March 29, 2011, Complainant informed Aspen via email that she was in the process of transitioning from male to female and she requested that Aspen inform the Director of the Walnut Creek lab of this change. According to Complainant, on April 3, 2011, Aspen informed Complainant that the Agency had been informed of her change in name and gender. Five days later, on April 8, 2011, Complainant received an email from the contractor’s Director of Operations stating that, due to federal budget reductions, the position at Walnut Creek was no longer available.

According to Complainant, she was concerned about this quick change in events and on May 10, 2011,³ she contacted an agency EEO counselor to discuss her concerns. She states that the counselor told her that the position at Walnut Creek had not been cut but, rather, that someone

² It appears from the record that Aspen of DC may be considered a staffing firm. Under the Commission’s Enforcement Guidance: Application of EEO Laws to Contingent Workers Placed by Temporary Employment Agencies and Other Staffing Firms, EEOC Notice No. 915.002 (December 3, 1997), we have recognized that a “joint employment” relationship may exist where both the Agency and the “staffing firm” may be deemed employers. The Commission makes no determination at this time as to whether or not a “joint employment” relationship exists in this case as this issue is not presently before us.

³ On March 28, 2011, Complainant received an e-mail from the contractor asking her to fill out an application packet for the position. It is unclear how far the background investigation had proceeded prior to Complainant notifying the contractor of her gender change, but e-mails included in the record indicate that the Agency’s Personnel Security Branch had received Complainant’s completed security package, that Complainant had been interviewed by a security investigator, and that the investigator had contacted Complainant on March 31, 2011 and had indicated that he “hope[d] to finish your investigation the first of next week.”

⁴ In the narrative accompanying her formal complaint, Complainant asserts she contacted the Agency’s EEO Counselor on May 5, 2011. However, the EEO Counselor’s report indicates that the initial contact occurred on May 10, 2011.
else had been hired for the position. Complainant further states that the counselor told her that the Agency had decided to take the other individual because that person was farthest along in the background investigation. Complainant claims that this was a pretextual explanation because the background investigation had been proceeding on her as well. Complainant believes she was incorrectly informed that the position had been cut because the Agency did not want to hire her because she is transgender.

The EEO counselor’s report indicates that Complainant alleged that she had been discriminated against based on sex, and had specifically described her claim of discrimination as “change in gender (from male to female).”

On June 13, 2011, Complainant filed her formal EEO complaint with the Agency. On her formal complaint form, Complainant checked off “sex” and the box “female,” and then typed in “gender identity” and “sex stereotyping” as the basis of her complaint. In the narrative accompanying her complaint, Complainant stated that she was discriminated against on the basis of “my sex, gender identity (transgender woman) and on the basis of sex stereotyping.”

On October 26, 2011, the Agency issued Complainant a Letter of Acceptance, stating that the “claim alleged and being accepted and referred for investigation is the following: Whether you were discriminated against based on your gender identity sex (female) stereotyping when on May 5, 2011, you learned that you were not hired as a Contractor for the position of [NIBIN] Ballistics Forensic Technician in the Walnut Creek Lab, San Francisco Field Office.” The letter went on to state, however, that “since claims of discrimination on the basis of gender identity stereotyping cannot be adjudicated before the [EEOC], your claims will be processed according to Department of Justice policy.” The letter provided that if Complainant did not agree with how the Agency had identified her claim, she should contact the EEO office within 15 days.

The Department of Justice has one system for adjudicating claims of sex discrimination under Title VII and a separate system for adjudicating complaints of sexual orientation and gender identity discrimination by its employees. This separate process does not include the same rights offered under Title VII and the EEOC regulations set forth under 29 C.F.R. Part 1614. See Department of Justice Order 1200.1, Chapter 4-1, B.7.j, found at http://www.justice.gov/jmd/ps/chpt4-1.html (last accessed on March 30, 2012). While such complaints are processed utilizing the same EEO complaint process and time frames – including an ADR program, an EEO investigation and issuance of a final Agency decision – the Department of Justice process allows for fewer remedies and does not include the right to request a hearing before an EEOC Administrative Judge or the right to appeal the final Agency decision to the Commission.

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5 The Counselor’s Report includes several email exchanges with various Agency officials who informed the counselor of the circumstances by which it was decided not to hire Complainant.
On November 8, 2011, Complainant’s attorney contacted the Agency by letter to explain that the claims that Complainant had set forth in the formal complaint had not been correctly identified by the Agency. The letter explained that the claim as identified by the Agency was both incomplete and confusing. The letter noted that “[Complainant] is a transgender woman who was discriminated against during the hiring process for a job with [the Agency],” and that the discrimination against Complainant was based on “separate and related” factors, including on the basis of sex, sex stereotyping, sex due to gender transition/change of sex, and sex due to gender identity. Thus, Complainant disagreed with the Agency’s contention that her claim in its entirety could not be adjudicated through the Title VII and EEOC process simply because of how she had stated the alleged bases of discrimination.

On November 18, 2011, the Agency issued a correction to its Letter of Acceptance in response to Complainant’s November 8, 2011 letter. In this letter, the Agency stated that it was accepting the complaint “on the basis of sex (female) and gender identity stereotyping.” However, the Agency again stated that it would process only her claim “based on sex (female)” under Title VII and the EEOC’s Part 1614 regulations. Her claim based on “gender identity stereotyping” would be processed instead under the Agency’s “policy and practice,” including the issuance of a final Agency decision from the Agency’s Complaint Adjudication Office.

**CONTENTIONS ON APPEAL**

On December 6, 2011, Complainant, through counsel, submitted a Notice of Appeal to the Commission asking that it adjudicate the claim that she was discriminated against on the basis of “sex stereotyping, sex discrimination based gender transition/change of sex, and sex discrimination based gender identity” when she was denied the position as an NIBIN ballistics technician.

Complainant argues that EEOC has jurisdiction over her entire claim. She further asserts that the Agency’s “reclassification” of her claim of discrimination into two separate claims of discrimination – one “based on sex (female) under Title VII” which the Agency will investigate under Title VII and the EEOC’s Part 1614 regulations, and a separate claim of discrimination based on “gender identity stereotyping” which the Agency will investigate under a separate process designated for such claims -- is a “de facto dismissal” of her Title VII claim of discrimination based on gender identity and transgender status.

In response to Complainant’s appeal, the Agency sent a letter to the Commission on January 11, 2012, arguing that Complainant’s appeal was “premature” because the Agency had accepted a claim designated as discrimination “based on sex (female).”

In response to the Agency’s January 11, 2012 letter, Complainant wrote to the Agency on February 8, 2012, stating that, in light of how the Agency was characterizing her claim, she wished to withdraw her claim of “discrimination based on sex (female),” as characterized by the Agency, and to pursue solely the Agency’s dismissal of her complaint of discrimination.
based on her gender identity, change of sex and/or transgender status. In a letter to the
Commission dated February 9, 2012, Complainant explained that she had withdrawn the claim
“based on sex (female)” as the Agency had characterized it, in order to remove any possible
procedural claim that her appeal to the Commission was premature.

Complainant reiterates her contention that the Agency mischaracterized her claim and asks the
Commission to rule on her appeal that the Agency should investigate, under Title VII and the
EEOC’s Part 1514 regulations, her claim of discriminatory failure to hire based on her gender
identity, change of sex, and/or transgender status.

**ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS**

The narrative accompanying Complainant’s complaint makes clear that she believes she was
not hired for the position as a result of making her transgender status known. As already noted,
Complainant stated that she was discriminated against on the basis of “my sex, gender identity
(transgender woman) and on the basis of sex stereotyping.” In response to her complaint, the
Agency stated that claims of gender identity discrimination “cannot be adjudicated before the
[EEOC].” See Agency Letters of October 26, 2011 and November 18, 2011. Although it is
possible that the Agency would have fully addressed her claims under that portion of her
complaint accepted under the 1614 process, the Agency’s communications prompted in
Complainant a reasonable belief that the Agency viewed the gender identity discrimination she
alleged as outside the scope of Title VII’s sex discrimination prohibitions. Based on these
communications, Complainant believed that her complaint would not be investigated effectively
by the Agency, and she filed the instant appeal.

EEOC Regulation 29 C.F.R. §1614.107(b) provides that where an agency decides that some,
but not all, of the claims in a complaint should be dismissed, it must notify the complainant of
its determination. However, this determination is not appealable until final action is taken on
the remainder of the complaint. In apparent recognition of the operation of §1614.107(b),
Complainant withdrew the accepted portion of her complaint from the 1614 process so that the
constructive dismissal of her gender identity discrimination claim would be a final decision and
the matter ripe for appeal.

In the interest of resolving the confusion regarding a recurring legal issue that is demonstrated
by this complaint’s procedural history, as well as to ensure efficient use of resources, we
accept this appeal for adjudication. Moreover, EEOC’s responsibilities under Executive Order
12067 for enforcing all Federal EEO laws and leading the Federal government’s efforts to
eradicate workplace discrimination, require, among other things, that EEOC ensure that
uniform standards be implemented defining the nature of employment discrimination under the
statutes we enforce. Executive Order 12067, 43 F.R. 28967, § 1-301(a) (June 30, 1978). To
that end, the Commission hereby clarifies that claims of discrimination based on transgender
status, also referred to as claims of discrimination based on gender identity, are cognizable under Title VII’s sex discrimination prohibition, and may therefore be processed under Part 1614 of EEOC’s federal sector EEO complaints process.

We find that the Agency mistakenly separated Complainant’s complaint into separate claims: one described as discrimination based on “sex” (which the Agency accepted for processing under Title VII) and others that were alternatively described by Complainant as “sex stereotyping,” “gender transition/change of sex,” and “gender identity” (Complainant Letter of Nov. 8, 2011); by the Agency as “gender identity stereotyping” (Agency Letter Nov. 18, 2011); and finally by Complainant as “gender identity, change of sex and/or transgender status” (Complainant Letter Feb. 8, 2012). While Complainant could have chosen to avail herself of the Agency’s administrative procedures for discrimination based on gender identity, she clearly expressed her desire to have her claims investigated through the 1614 process, and this desire should have been honored. Each of the formulations of Complainant’s claims are simply different ways of stating the same claim of discrimination “based on . . . sex,” a claim cognizable under Title VII.

Title VII states that, except as otherwise specifically provided, “[a]ll personnel actions affecting [federal] employees or applicants for employment ... shall be made free from any discrimination based on ... sex ....” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(a) (emphasis added). Cf. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(a)(1), (2) (it is unlawful for a covered employer to “fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment,” or to “limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such individual’s . . . sex”) (emphasis added).

As used in Title VII, the term “sex” “encompasses both sex—that is, the biological differences between men and women—and gender.” See Schwenk v. Hartford, 204 F.3d 1187, 1202 (9th Cir. 2000); see also Smith v. City of Salem, 378 F.3d 566, 572 (6th Cir. 2004) (“The Supreme Court made clear in the context of Title VII, discrimination because of ‘sex’ includes gender discrimination.”). As the Eleventh Circuit noted in Glenn v. Brumby, 663 F.3d 1312, 1316 (11th Cir. 2011), six members of the Supreme Court in Price Waterhouse agreed that Title VII barred “not just discrimination because of biological sex, but also gender stereotyping—failing to act and appear according to expectations defined by gender.” As such, the terms “gender” and “sex” are often used interchangeably to describe the discrimination prohibited by Title VII. See, e.g., Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 239 (1989) (emphasis added) (“Congress’ intent to forbid employers to take gender into account in making employment decisions appears on the face of the statute.”).

That Title VII’s prohibition on sex discrimination proscribes gender discrimination, and not just discrimination on the basis of biological sex, is important. If Title VII proscribed only discrimination on the basis of biological sex, the only prohibited gender-based disparate treatment would be when an employer prefers a man over a woman, or vice versa. But the
statute’s protections sweep far broader than that, in part because the term “gender” encompasses not only a person’s biological sex but also the cultural and social aspects associated with masculinity and femininity.

In Price Waterhouse, the employer refused to make a female senior manager, Hopkins, a partner at least in part because she did not act as some of the partners thought a woman should act. Id. at 230–31, 235. She was informed, for example, that to improve her chances for partnership she should “walk more femininely, talk more femininely, dress more femininely, wear make-up, have her hair styled, and wear jewelry.” Id. at 235. The Court concluded that discrimination for failing to conform with gender-based expectations violates Title VII, holding that “[i]n the specific context of sex stereotyping, an employer who acts on the basis of a belief that a woman cannot be aggressive, or that she must not be, has acted on the basis of gender.” Id. at 250.

Although the partners at Price Waterhouse discriminated against Ms. Hopkins for failing to conform to stereotypical gender norms, gender discrimination occurs any time an employer treats an employee differently for failing to conform to any gender-based expectations or norms. “What matters, for purposes of . . . the Price Waterhouse analysis, is that in the mind of the perpetrator the discrimination is related to the sex of the victim.” Schwenk, 204 F.3d at 1201–02; see also Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 254–55 (noting the illegitimacy of allowing “sex-linked evaluations to play a part in the [employer’s] decision-making process”).

“Title VII does identify one circumstance in which an employer may take gender into account in making an employment decision, namely, when gender is a ‘bona fide occupational qualification [ (BFOQ) ] reasonably necessary to the normal operation of the[ ] particular business or enterprise.’” Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 242 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)). Even then, “the BFOQ exception was in fact meant to be an extremely narrow exception to the general prohibition of discrimination on the basis of sex.” See Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542, 544 (1971) (Marshall, J., concurring). “The only plausible inference to draw from this provision is that, in all other circumstances, a person’s gender may not be considered in making decisions that affect her.” Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 242.

When an employer discriminates against someone because the person is transgender, the employer has engaged in disparate treatment “related to the sex of the victim.” See Schwenk, 204 F.3d at 1202. This is true regardless of whether an employer discriminates against an employee because the individual has expressed his or her gender in a non-stereotypical fashion, because the employer is uncomfortable with the fact that the person has transitioned or is in the process of transitioning from one gender to another, or because the employer simply does not

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6 There are other, limited instances in which gender may be taken into account, such as in the context of a valid affirmative action plan, see Johnson v. Santa Clara County Transportation Agency, 480 U.S. 616 (1987), or relatedly, as part of a settlement of a pattern or practice claim.
like that the person is identifying as a transgender person. In each of these circumstances, the employer is making a gender-based evaluation, thus violating the Supreme Court’s admonition that “an employer may not take gender into account in making an employment decision.” Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 244.

Since Price Waterhouse, courts have widely recognized the availability of the sex stereotyping theory as a valid method of establishing discrimination “on the basis of sex” in many scenarios involving individuals who act or appear in gender-nonconforming ways. And since Price Waterhouse, courts also have widely recognized the availability of the sex stereotyping theory as a valid method of establishing discrimination “on the basis of sex” in scenarios involving transgender individuals.

For example, in Schwenk v. Hartford, a prison guard had sexually assaulted a pre-operative male-to-female transgender prisoner, and the prisoner sued, alleging that the guard had

7 See, e.g., Lewis v. Heartland Inns of Am., L.L.C., 591 F.3d 1033, 1041 (8th Cir. 2010) (concluding that evidence that a female “tomboyish” plaintiff had been fired for not having the “Midwestern girl look” suggested “her employer found her unsuited for her job . . . because her appearance did not comport with its preferred feminine stereotype”); Prowel v. Wise Business Forms, Inc., 579 F.3d 285 (3rd Cir. 2009) (an effeminate gay man who did not conform to his employer’s vision of how a man should look, speak, and act provided sufficient evidence of gender stereotyping harassment under Title VII); Medina v. Income Support Div., 413 F.3d 1131, 1135 (10th Cir. 2005) (involving a heterosexual female who alleged that her lesbian supervisor discriminated against her on the basis of sex, and finding that “a plaintiff may satisfy her evidentiary burden [under Title VII] by showing that the harasser was acting to punish the plaintiff’s noncompliance with gender stereotypes”); Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., 256 F.3d 864, 874-75 (9th Cir. 2001) (concluding that a male plaintiff stated a Title VII claim when he was discriminated against “for walking and carrying his tray ‘like a woman’ - i.e., for having feminine mannerisms”); Simonson v. Runyon, 232 F.3d 33, 37 (2d Cir. 2000) (indicating that a gay man would have a viable Title VII claim if “the abuse he suffered was discrimination based on sexual stereotypes, which may be cognizable as discrimination based on sex”); Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc., 194 F.3d 252, 261 n.4 (1st Cir. 1999) (analyzing a gay plaintiff’s claim that his co-workers harassed him by “mocking his supposedly effeminate characteristics” and acknowledging that “just as a woman can ground an action on a claim that men discriminated against her because she did not meet stereotyped expectations of femininity . . . a man can ground a claim on evidence that other men discriminated against him because he did not meet stereotypical expectations of masculinity”); Doe by Doe v. City of Belleville, 119 F.3d 563, 580-81 (7th Cir. 1997) (involving a heterosexual male who was harassed by other heterosexual males, and concluding that “a man who is harassed because his voice is soft, his physique is slight, his hair is long, or because in some other respect he . . . does not meet his coworkers’ idea of how men are to appear and behave, is harassed ‘because of’ his sex”), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 523 U.S. 1001 (1998).
violated the Gender Motivated Violence Act (GMVA), 42 U.S.C. § 13981. 204 F.3d at 1201-02. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit found that the guard had known that the prisoner "considered herself a transsexual and that she planned to seek sex reassignment surgery in the future." Id. at 1202. According to the court, the guard had targeted the transgender prisoner "only after he discovered that she considered herself female[,]" and the guard was "motivated, at least in part, by [her] gender"—that is, "by her assumption of a feminine rather than a typically masculine appearance or demeanor." Id. On these facts, the Ninth Circuit readily concluded that the guard's attack constituted discrimination because of gender within the meaning of both the GMVA and Title VII.

The court relied on Price Waterhouse, reasoning that it stood for the proposition that discrimination based on sex includes discrimination based on a failure "to conform to socially-constructed gender expectations." Id. at 1201-02. Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit concluded, discrimination against transgender females — i.e., "as anatomical males whose outward behavior and inward identity [do] not meet social definitions of masculinity" — is actionable discrimination "because of sex." Id. (emphasis added); cf. Rosa v. Park W. Bank & Trust Co., 214 F.3d 213, 215-16 (1st Cir. 2000) (finding that under Price Waterhouse, a bank's refusal to give a loan application to a biologically-male plaintiff dressed in "traditionally feminine attire" because his "attire did not accord with his male gender" stated a claim of illegal sex discrimination in violation of the Equal Credit Opportunity Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1691-1691f).

Similarly, in Smith v. City of Salem, the plaintiff was "biologically and by birth male." 378 F.3d at 568. However, Smith was diagnosed with Gender Identity Disorder (GID), and began to present at work as a female (in accordance with medical protocols for treatment of GID). Id. Smith's co-workers began commenting that her appearance and mannerisms were "not masculine enough." Id. Smith's employer later subjected her to numerous psychological evaluations, and ultimately suspended her. Id. at 569-70. Smith filed suit under Title VII alleging that her employer had discriminated against her because of sex, "both because of [her] gender non-conforming conduct and, more generally, because of [her] identification as a transsexual." Id. at 571 (emphasis added).

The district court rejected Smith's efforts to prove her case using a sex-stereotyping theory, concluding that it was really an attempt to challenge discrimination based on "transsexuality." Id. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed, stating that the district court's conclusion:

cannot be reconciled with Price Waterhouse, which does not make Title VII protection against sex stereotyping conditional or provide any reason to exclude Title VII coverage for non-sex-stereotypical behavior simply because the person is a transsexual. As such, discrimination against a plaintiff who is a transsexual—and therefore fails to act and/or identify with his or her gender—is no different from the discrimination directed against [the plaintiff] in Price Waterhouse who, in sex-stereotypical terms, did not act like a woman. Sex
stereotyping based on a person's gender non-conforming behavior is impermissible discrimination, irrespective of the cause of that behavior; a label, such as "transsexual" is not fatal to a sex discrimination claim where the victim has suffered discrimination because of his or her gender non-conformity. Accordingly, we hold that Smith has stated a claim for relief pursuant to Title VII's prohibition of sex discrimination.

Id. at 574–75. 8

Finally, as the Eleventh Circuit suggested in Glenn v. Brumby, 663 F.3d 1312 (11th Cir. 2011), consideration of gender stereotypes will inherently be part of what drives discrimination against a transgendered individual. In that case, the employer testified at his deposition that it had fired Vandiver Elizabeth Glenn, a transgender woman, because he considered it "inappropriate" for her to appear at work dressed as a woman and that he found it "unsettling" and "unnatural" that she would appear wearing women's clothing. Id. at 1320. The firing supervisor further testified that his decision to dismiss Glenn was based on his perception of Glenn as "a man dressed as a woman and made up as a woman," and admitted that his decision to fire her was based on "the sheer fact of the transition." Id. at 1320–21. According to the Eleventh Circuit, this testimony "provides ample direct evidence" to support the conclusion that the employer acted on the basis of the plaintiff's gender non-conformity and therefore granted summary judgment to her. Id. at 1321.

In setting forth its legal reasoning, the Eleventh Circuit explained:

A person is defined as transgender precisely because of the perception that his or her behavior transgresses gender stereotypes. "[T]he very acts that define transgender people as transgender are those that contradict stereotypes of gender-appropriate appearance and behavior." Ilona M. Turner, Sex Stereotyping Per Se: Transgender Employees and Title VII, 95 Cal. L. Rev. 561, 563 (2007); see also Taylor Flynn, Transforming the Debate: Why We Need to Include Transgender Rights in the Struggles for Sex and Sexual Orientation Equality, 101 Colum. L. Rev. 392, 392 (2001) (defining transgender persons as those whose "appearance, behavior, or other personal characteristics differ from traditional gender norms"). There is thus a congruence between discriminating against transgender and transsexual individuals and discrimination on the basis of gender-based behavioral norms.

8 See also Barnes v. City of Cincinnati, 401 F.3d 729, 741 (6th Cir. 2005) (affirming a jury award in favor of a pre-operative transgender female, ruling that "a claim for sex discrimination under Title VII . . . can properly lie where the claim is based on 'sexual stereotypes'" and that the "district court therefore did not err when it instructed the jury that it could find discrimination based on 'sexual stereotypes'".).
Accordingly, discrimination against a transgender individual because of her gender-nonconformity is sex discrimination, whether it’s described as being on the basis of sex or gender.

Glenn v. Brumby, 663 F.3d 1312, 1316–17 (11th Cir. 2011). 9

There has likewise been a steady stream of district court decisions recognizing that discrimination against transgender individuals on the basis of sex stereotyping constitutes discrimination because of sex. Most notably, in Schroer v. Billington, the Library of Congress rescinded an offer of employment it had extended to a transgender job applicant after the applicant informed the Library’s hiring officials that she intended to undergo a gender transition. See 577 F. Supp. 2d 293 (D.D.C. 2008). The U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia entered judgment in favor of the plaintiff on her Title VII sex discrimination claim. According to the district court, it did not matter “for purposes of Title VII liability whether the Library withdrew its offer of employment because it perceived Schroer to be an insufficiently masculine man, an insufficiently feminine woman, or an inherently gender-nonconforming transsexual.” Id. at 305. In any case, Schroer was “entitled to judgment based on a Price-Waterhouse-type claim for sex stereotyping . . . .” Id. 10

To be sure, the members of Congress that enacted Title VII in 1964 and amended it in 1972 were likely not considering the problems of discrimination that were faced by transgender individuals. But as the Supreme Court recognized in Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc.: 9


Statutory prohibitions often go beyond the principal evil [they were passed to combat] to cover reasonably comparable evils, and it is ultimately the provisions of our laws rather than the principal concerns of our legislators by which we are governed. Title VII prohibits "discrimination . . . because of . . . sex" in . . . employment. [This] . . . must extend to [sex-based discrimination] of any kind that meets the statutory requirements.

523 U.S. at 79-80; see also Newport News, 462 U.S. at 679-81 (rejecting the argument that discrimination against men does not violate Title VII despite the fact that discrimination against women was plainly the principal problem that Title VII’s prohibition of sex discrimination was enacted to combat).

Although most courts have found protection for transgender people under Title VII under a theory of gender stereotyping, evidence of gender stereotyping is simply one means of proving sex discrimination. Title VII prohibits discrimination based on sex whether motivated by hostility, 11 by a desire to protect people of a certain gender, 12 by assumptions that disadvantage men, 13 by gender stereotypes, 14 or by the desire to accommodate other people’s prejudices or discomfort. 15 While evidence that an employer has acted based on stereotypes about how men or women should act is certainly one means of demonstrating disparate treatment based on sex, "sex stereotyping" is not itself an independent cause of action. As the Price Waterhouse Court

11 See Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 64 (1986) (recognizing that sexual harassment is actionable discrimination “because of sex”); Oncal v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 80 (1998) (“A trier of fact might reasonably find such discrimination, for example, if a female victim is harassed in such sex-specific and derogatory terms by another woman as to make it clear that the harasser is motivated by general hostility to the presence of women in the workplace.”).

12 See Int’l Union v. Johnson Controls, 499 U.S. 187, 191 (1991) (policy barring all female employees except those who were infertile from working in jobs that exposed them to lead was facially discriminatory on the basis of sex).

13 See, e.g., Newport News, 462 U.S. at 679-81 (providing different insurance coverage to male and female employees violates Title VII even though women are treated better).

14 See, e.g., Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 250-52.

15 See, e.g., Chaney v. Plainfield Healthcare Ctr., 612 F.3d 908, 912 (7th Cir. 2010) (concluding that “assignment sheet that unambiguously, and daily, reminded [the plaintiff, a black nurse,] and her co-workers that certain residents preferred no black” nurses created a hostile work environment); Fernandez v. Wynn Oil Co., 653 F.2d 1273, 1276-77 (9th Cir. 1981) (a female employee could not lawfully be fired because her employer’s foreign clients would only work with males); Diaz v. Pan American World Airways, Inc., 442 F.2d 385, 389 (5th Cir. 1971) (rejecting customer preference for female flight attendants as justification for discrimination against male applicants).
noted, while "stereotyped remarks can certainly be evidence that gender played a part" in an adverse employment action, the central question is always whether the "employer actually relied on [the employee's] gender in making its decision." Id. at 251 (emphasis in original).

Thus, a transgender person who has experienced discrimination based on his or her gender identity may establish a prima facie case of sex discrimination through any number of different formulations. These different formulations are not, however, different claims of discrimination that can be separated out and investigated within different systems. Rather, they are simply different ways of describing sex discrimination.

For example, Complainant could establish a case of sex discrimination under a theory of gender stereotyping by showing that she did not get the job as an NIBIN ballistics technician at Walnut Creek because the employer believed that biological men should consistently present as men and wear male clothing.

Alternatively, if Complainant can prove that the reason that she did not get the job at Walnut Creek is that the Director was willing to hire her when he thought she was a man, but was not willing to hire her once he found out that she was now a woman—she will have proven that the Director discriminated on the basis of sex. Under this theory, there would actually be no need, for purposes of establishing coverage under Title VII, for Complainant to compile any evidence that the Director was engaging in gender stereotyping.

In this respect, gender is no different from religion. Assume that an employee considers herself Christian and identifies as such. But assume that an employer finds out that the employee's parents are Muslim, believes that the employee should therefore be Muslim, and terminates the employee on that basis. No one would doubt that such an employer discriminated on the basis of religion. There would be no need for the employee who experienced the adverse employment action to demonstrate that the employer acted on the basis of some religious stereotype—although, clearly, discomfort with the choice made by the employee with regard to religion would presumably be at the root of the employer's actions. But for purposes of establishing a prima facie case that Title VII has been violated, the employee simply must demonstrate that the employer impermissibly used religion in making its employment decision.

The District Court in Schroer provided reasoning along similar lines:

Imagine that an employee is fired because she converts from Christianity to Judaism. Imagine too that her employer testifies that he harbors no bias toward either Christians or Jews but only "converts." That would be a clear case of discrimination "because of religion." No court would take seriously the notion that "converts" are not covered by the statute. Discrimination "because of religion" easily encompasses discrimination because of a change of religion.

577 F. Supp. 2d at 306.
Applying Title VII in this manner does not create a new "class" of people covered under Title VII—for example, the "class" of people who have converted from Islam to Christianity or from Christianity to Judaism. Rather, it would simply be the result of applying the plain language of a statute prohibiting discrimination on the basis of religion to practical situations in which such characteristics are unlawfully taken into account. See Brumby, 663 F.3d at 1318-19 (noting that "all persons, whether transgender or not" are protected from discrimination and "[a]n individual cannot be punished because of his or her perceived gender non-conformity").

Thus, we conclude that intentional discrimination against a transgender individual because that person is transgender is, by definition, discrimination "based on . . . sex," and such discrimination therefore violates Title VII. 16

CONCLUSION

Accordingly, the Agency's final decision declining to process Complainant's entire complaint within the Part 1614 EEO complaints process is REVERSED. The complaint is hereby REMANDED to the Agency for further processing in accordance with this decision and the Order below.

ORDER (E0610)

The Agency is ordered to process the remanded complaint in accordance with 29 C.F.R. § 1614.108 et seq. The Agency shall acknowledge to the Complainant that it has received the remanded claims within thirty (30) calendar days of the date this decision becomes final. The Agency shall issue to Complainant a copy of the investigative file and also shall notify Complainant of the appropriate rights within one hundred fifty (150) calendar days of the date this decision becomes final, unless the matter is otherwise resolved prior to that time. If the Complainant requests a final decision without a hearing, the Agency shall issue a final decision within sixty (60) days of receipt of Complainant's request. A copy of the Agency's letter of acknowledgment to Complainant and a copy of the notice that transmits the investigative file and notice of rights must be sent to the Compliance Officer as referenced below.

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16 The Commission previously took this position in an amicus brief docketed with the district court in the Western District of Texas on Oct. 17, 2011, where it explained that "[i]t is the position of the EEOC that disparate treatment of an employee because he or she is transgender is discrimination "because of . . . sex" under Title VII." EEOC Amicus Brief in Pacheco v. Freedom Buick GMC Truck, No. 07-116 (W.D. Tex. Oct. 17, 2011), Dkt. No. 30, at page 1, 2011 WL 5410751. With this decision, we expressly overturn, in light of the recent developments in the caselaw described above, any contrary earlier decisions from the Commission. See, e.g., Jennifer Casoni v. United States Postal Service, EEOC DOC 01840104 (Sept. 28, 1984); Campbell v. Dep't of Agriculture, EEOC Appeal No. 01931703 (July 21, 1994); Kowalczyk v. Dep't of Veterans Affairs, EEOC Appeal No. 01942053 (March 14, 1996).
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE COMMISSION’S DECISION (K0610)

Compliance with the Commission’s corrective action is mandatory. The Agency shall submit its compliance report within thirty (30) calendar days of the completion of all ordered corrective action. The report shall be submitted to the Compliance Officer, Office of Federal Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 77960, Washington, DC 20013. The Agency’s report must contain supporting documentation, and the Agency must send a copy of all submissions to the Complainant. If the Agency does not comply with the Commission’s order, the Complainant may petition the Commission for enforcement of the order. 29 C.F.R. § 1614.503(a). The Complainant also has the right to file a civil action to enforce compliance with the Commission’s order prior to or following an administrative petition for enforcement. See 29 C.F.R. §§ 1614.407, 1614.408, and 29 C.F.R. § 1614.503(g). Alternatively, the Complainant has the right to file a civil action on the underlying complaint in accordance with the paragraph below entitled “Right to File a Civil Action.” 29 C.F.R. §§ 1614.407 and 1614.408. A civil action for enforcement or a civil action on the underlying complaint is subject to the deadline stated in 42 U.S.C. 2000e-16(c) (1994 & Supp. IV 1999). If the Complainant files a civil action, the administrative processing of the complaint, including any petition for enforcement, will be terminated. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.409.

STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL

RECONSIDERATION (M0610)

The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this case if the Complainant or the Agency submits a written request containing arguments or evidence which tends to establish that:

1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation of material fact or law; or

2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies, practices, or operations of the Agency.

Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed with the Office of Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar days of receipt of this decision or within twenty (20) calendar days of receipt of another party’s timely request for reconsideration. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for 29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), at 9-18 (Nov. 9, 1999). All requests and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of Federal Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 77960, Washington, DC 20013. In the absence of a legible postmark, the request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.604. The request or opposition must also include proof of service on the other party.
Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.604(c).

**COMPLAINANT’S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (R0610)**

This is a decision requiring the Agency to continue its administrative processing of your complaint. However, if you wish to file a civil action, you have the right to file such action in an appropriate United States District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you receive this decision. In the alternative, you may file a civil action after one hundred and eighty (180) calendar days of the date you filed your complaint with the Agency, or filed your appeal with the Commission. If you file a civil action, you must name as the defendant in the complaint the person who is the official Agency head or department head, identifying that person by his or her full name and official title. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your case in court. “Agency” or “department” means the national organization, and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. **Filing a civil action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.**

**RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z0610)**

If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot afford the services of an attorney, you may request from the Court that the Court appoint an attorney to represent you and that the Court also permit you to file the action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.; the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. §§ 791, 794(c). **The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of the Court.** Filing a request for an attorney with the Court does not extend your time in which to file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action must be filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above (“Right to File a Civil Action”).

FOR THE COMMISSION:

[Signature]

Bernadette B. Wilson
Acting Executive Officer
Executive Secretariat

[Signature]

April 20, 2012
Date